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The old associationist treatment of consciousness, more logical
than psychological, considered consciousness as consisting of a series
of ideas, such series, moreover, being considered in abstracto. In
what lay the fault of such a view? Miss Calkins has given us a care-
fully prepared monograph to show wherein such a treatment is lack-
ing, and has also supplied what in her opinion is necessary. Accord-
ing to Miss Calkins, we must supplement the structural standpoint by
what she calls the point of view of the ' self-psychology ' (Ichfisycho-
logie), i. e., a view of consciousness as the consciousness ' of a per-
sonal self in all its relations and phases' (p. 9), a psychology of selves,
as it were.
At this point a question seems to me to remain unanswered.
Granted a consciousness which is always in relation to another self or
subject, a social consciousness as it were (pp. 35, 36), how does that
help us any as regards the serial explanation? I do not here wish to
uphold any special theory, but simply to seek light on the modifica-
tion of the,English view by the psychology which is treated as a sci-
ence of selves. It seems to me that the latter method is trying to ex-
plain the problem by scattering it among a number of selves, by losing
it in a multitude. Now, granted a series of ideas, how can we help
explain consciousness by making such ideas social, or related to other
selves? By relating them to other selves, we still leave them in all
their barrenness, they still are discrete, they still remain atomistic and
self-sufficient. If each is related to a number of other selves, we have
the same old series with further complications which remain unex-
plained. Miss Calkins becomes somewhat more explicit in the treat-
ment of perception and ideation, and perhaps it is here that the two
standpoints are shown as mutually supporting each other.
In the former case, according to the one point of view, we have
simply a succession of percepts which may undergo the usual analysis.
According to the other standpoint, that of psychology treated as a sci-
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ence of selves, every perception of an object has with it the added ex-
perience of a feeling due to the presence of concomitant observers who
also perceive this object. ' In perception,' says Miss Calkins, ' I am
always conscious that I am sharing the experience of others' (p. 42).
This seems evident to Miss Calkins for the following reasons: (1)
We verify a doubtful perception by appealing to the experience of
others; and (2) we are able according to this theory to understand
why we class some impressions as ' higher' than others. Visual im-
pressions are considered the ' highest,' so Miss Calkins says, because
they are such as can be shared by the greatest number of individuals
(p. 43). And to the possible objection that we may perceive objects
when no one is around, Miss Calkins even then by a continual appeal
to introspection feels the object as one which may be experienced by
others. ' Solitary and alone,' says she, ' when, in my study, I ana
aware of my desk for example, I have at the same time an indistinct
consciousness that other persons, were they present, would see the
same thing' (p. 43).
These seem to be very good reasons, but have they really anything
to do with the case ? Is it moreover a fact that this vague, dreamy,
haunting feeling of another's possible presence is always involved in
any perception ? Is there not a most vicious example of the psycholo-
gist's fallacy here present? This objection can be safely left to the
reader's judgment, without further remark by me. Concerning the
verifying of perception by means of the experience of others, is this
also a fact as stated? The point at issue in the latter case, it seems
to me, is the kind of experience needed for verification, whether my
own or that of others. Do we always need to verify our experience
by such social appeal; or do we not rather of our own account attempt
in verification to explicate our attitude by a series of reactions or
motor adjustments? This point, too, I think can be safely left to the
reader. Finally, as regards perception, supposing all the above men-
tioned statements of Miss Calkins to be correct, I do not see how such
social awareness has anything to do with improving the structural
view of consciousness as a series of abstract moments. We have
simply the same old series, plus an awareness that others have or can
have a similar series.
Further, as regards imagination and thought: "Psychologically,
to distinguish imagination or fancy from perception, we must have
recourse to ' self-psychology.' * * * The world of perception is in fact
the world in common, which lies open to all. On the other hand,
dreams and images belong only to individual beings" (p. 45). A
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rather subtle fallacy is here involved, which is also present in the
social theory of perception. It is, briefly stated, the following:
Since there is a common world to perception, therefore, the common
world of perception gives us a world of common or shared percep-
tion ; and experience as self-experience must on that account neces-
sarily be different from that of every other. As a matter of fact, every
experience, whether of perception or of thought, is uniquely self-
experience; and perception of the same object can be shared only
insofar as the meaning of such object is the same for all concerned.
Moreover, as regards ideal revival, there is nothing to prevent a num-
ber of individuals from having the same idea, as idea. As regards
sameness, is there not just as much possible in the case of the image
as in the case of perception? Sameness of object is not necessarily
community of experience, nor is sameness of experience necessarily
shut out in all ideation. Is it not just on this latter that most social
appeal rests?
Underlying the whole treatment of ' der doppelte Standpunkt'
are the following misconceptions: (1) The isolation of the self as
opposed to community of knowledge (one question, mainly epistemo-
logical) is confused with the twofold aspect, structural versus func-
tional psychology (another problem). Miss Calkins takes the struc-
tural point of view, and opposes it to the problem of the community
of knowledge, which, wrongly it seems to me, she calls functional
(p. 33). (2) The consideration of psychology as a science of selves
is simply one aspect of the treatment of psychology which views con-
sciousness as always concerned with an object. From a psychological
standpoint 'social' means nothing. I am just as sociable, psycho-
logically, when I press closely a much prized object, as when I press
softly the hand of a friend, or share my experience with him or with
her. Psychologically I take an attitude towards each. Psycho-
logically I can abstract from the present moment and by analysis seek
certain elements. But as far as sociability is concerned, there is just
as much in the one case as in the other. The fact that the self is con-
nected with other selves is simply a form of the more general experi-
ence that consciousness always has an object, that every moment of
consciousness is filled with a content, and a variation of the philo-
sophical view so well expounded by Royce, that the universe forms
one interrelated whole.
Now Miss Calkins is perfectly justified in presenting her dis-
covery as ' EIN ' dofpelte Standpunkt, but hardly as ' DER ' doppelte
Standpunkt in der Psychologie. As a personal contribution it is
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acceptable on its own merits. But it seems hardly fair to foist it upon
psychology in general. What the twofold aspect of psychology is,
and wherein modern psychology is an advance on the structural view,
is overlooked by Miss Calkins. This twofold aspect, as it actually
exists, is seen in various fields. In literature we are beginning to em-
phasize the content, and the meaning, at the expense of the purely
verbal and grammatical analysis; in pedagogy we have passed out of
the Lockian view of the ' empty cabinet,' are forcing out the Pesta-
lozzian practice of object teaching as such, and are appealing rather
to self motivation and self activity under guidance; in biology, the
study of function holds equal rank with that of structure; in philosophy
we are ploughing out of the static into the dynamic view of the uni-
verse; and over all is arising the great cry, What does it all mean?
W H A T IS IT GOOD FOR ? Where no meaning is evident we tend to
cast it aside, or leave it for academic disputation. Use as here men-
tioned may refer to an attitude merely, as well as the more violent
form of reaction, and the aesthetic or ' useless' is of use in this sense.
It is here where Bradley makes his mistake in his various criticisms of
the modern movement. So too in ps3?chology this twofold aspect,
structural versus functional, is becoming more evident.
The inadequacy of the structural point of view in psychology to
explain the various facts of consciousness has given rise to the func-
tional and motor theories so ably put forth by Baldwin, Dewey, James
(more in his various articles), and Miinsterberg, the last named being
classed, in spite of his ' motor' theories, as a structural psychologist,
which it seems to me he is not in the least. Perception is studied,
not simply as an agglutination of sense elements nor as an association-
complex, but as an essentially motor process, giving meaning to the
object concerned, and determining serial reaction towards such object.
Images are not simply fleeting bits of sensationalist revival, but also
logical aids to action; and, as such, require further analysis to deter-
mine the motor tendencies and the attitudes bound with them. Even
by reducing all states to sensationalistic elements, we do not neces-
sarily restrict ourselves to the structural view, for such very structural
elements, if conceived as having meaning, may be motor, may help
in constituting the attitude taken.
As I have said above, if we take the contribution of Miss Calkins
as one originating with herself, and limited to her own views, we must
take it for what it is worth. But it is hardly a correct discussion of
the twofold aspect of psychology as it exists to-day, nor is it a proper
presentation of the attempt to harmonize such opposing views, in the
sensori-motor theories now of so much account.
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The psychological analysis of sensational elements, of volition and
belief, and of will and faith given by Miss Calkins in this monograph
is essentially the same as that set forth in her excellent Introduction
to Psychology and need not be further mentioned. Much work
requires to be done towards a complete sensori-motor psychology, and
Miss Calkins' attempt is valuable for at least stirring the waters of
this stream. FELIX ARNOLD.
NEW YORK CITY.
METAPHYSICS.
A System of Metaphysics. GEORGE STUART FULLERTON, Profes-
sor of Philosophy in Columbia University, New York. New
York, TheMacmillan Company; London,Macmillan & Co., Ltd.,
1904. Pp. x + 627.
This book is divided into four parts dealing with (1) ' T h e
Content of Consciousness'; (2) 'The External World ' ; (3) 'Mind
and Matter'; and (4) ' Other Minds and the Realm of Minds.' Each
subject is treated at length, and any adequate review of the work
would require a very long article, rather than the few pages that can
be given to its consideration in the BULLETIN. All that will therefore
be attempted here is to call attention to a few of the points that seem
worthy of study.
Part I. exposes the inadequacy of the ' psychological standpoint' in
metaphysical work. From this standpoint the mind is regarded as
' quite shut up, so far as its immediate knowledge goes, to its own
ideas; and though it may think of an external world, it is wholly im-
possible that it should look out of the windows and into the world
beyond, at any moment of its existence' (p. 21). " In contemplat-
ing its condition of complete insulation, we are struck by the oddity
of the fact that this whole doctrine rests upon reasonings in which it
is assumed that the mind is not shut up to its own experiences, but
directly knows an external world of things. The contradiction is pal-
pable and unmistakable; between premises and conclusion there is an
abyss which may be concealed by obscurity and confusion of thought,
but which cannot be bridged by any legitimate procedure" (p. 24).
Hence the metaphysician, if he is wise, must recognize that there are
' two kinds of thinking, ' a psychological and a metaphysical kind,
which ' are by no means the same, and one who does very good work
upon the plane of natural science,' that is, the plane occupied by the
psychologist, ' may still be incapable of doing good work of the latter
kind, unless he has some degree of aptitude and has enjoyed some
special training — a fact not infrequently overlooked, and sometimes
